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Abstract
Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We
propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following
question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence
of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by
them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations
to study the effects of delegations on group’s accuracy on variously structured social
networks.
1 Introduction
Liquid democracy (Blum & Zuber, 2016) is an influential proposal in recent debates on
democratic reforms in both Europe and the US. Several grassroots campaigns, as well as
local parties, experimented with this novel type of decision making procedure. Examples
include the German Piratenpartei1 and the EU Horizon 2020 project WeGovNow (Boella
et al., 2018), which have incorporated the LiquidFeedback2 platform in their decision
making, as well as grass-roots organizations such as the Democracy Earth Foundation3.
Liquid democracy is a form of proxy voting (Miller, 1969; Tullock, 1992; Alger, 2006;
Green-Armytage, 2015; Cohensius et al., 2017) where, in contrast to classical proxy voting,
proxies are delegable (or transitive, or transferable). Suppose we are voting on a binary
issue, then each voter can either cast her vote directly, or she can delegate her vote to a
proxy, who can again either vote directly or, in turn, delegate to yet another proxy, and
∗This paper (without Appendix) appears in the proceedings of AAAI’19. We are indebted to the
anonymous reviewers of IJCAI/ECAI’18 and AAAI’19 for many helpful comments on earlier versions
of this paper. We are also grateful to the participants of the LAMSADE seminar at Paris Dauphine
University, and the THEMA seminar at University Cergy-Pontoise where this work was presented, for many
helpful comments and suggestions. Daan Bloembergen has received funding in the framework of the joint
programming initiative ERA-Net Smart Energy Systems’ focus initiative Smart Grids Plus, with support
from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No
646039. Davide Grossi was partially supported by EPSRC under grant EP/M015815/1. Martin Lackner
was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under grant number 639945 (ACCORD) and by
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so forth. Ultimately, the voters that decided not to delegate cast their ballots, which now
carry the weight given by the number of voters who entrusted them as proxy, directly or
indirectly.
Contribution The starting point of our analysis is an often cited feature of liquid democ-
racy: transitive delegations reduce the level of duplicated effort required by direct voting,
by freeing voters from the need to invest effort in order to vote accurately. The focus of
the paper is the decision-making problem that voters, who are interested in casting an
accurate vote, face between voting directly, and thereby incurring a cost in terms of effort
invested to learn about the issue at hand, or delegating to another voter in their network,
thereby avoiding costs. We define a game-theoretic model, called delegation game, to
represent this type of interaction. We establish pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence
results for classes of delegation games, and study the quality of equilibria in terms of the
average accuracy they enable for the population of voters, both analytically and through
simulations. Proofs of the two main results (Theorems 1 and 2) are presented in full, while
we provide proofs of the simpler secondary results as an Appendix only.
By means of simulations we also study the effects of different network structures on
delegation games in terms of: performance against direct voting, average accuracy and the
probability of a correct majority vote, the number and quality of voters acting as ultimate
proxies (so-called gurus) and, finally, the presence of delegation cycles. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper providing a comprehensive study of liquid democracy
from a game-theoretic angle.
Related Work Although the idea of delegable proxy was already sketched by Dodg-
son (1884), only a few very recent papers have studied aspects of liquid democracy in
the (computational) social choice theory (Brandt et al., 2016) literature. Kling et al.
(2015) provide an analysis of election data from the main platform implementing a liquid
democracy voting system (Liquid Feedback) for the German Piratenpartei. They focus
on network theoretic properties emerging from the structure of delegations—with partic-
ular attention to the number of highly influential gurus or ‘super-voters’. Inspired by
their experimental analysis, Go¨lz et al. (2018) propose and analyze a variant of the liquid
democracy scheme able to restrict reliance on super-voters. Skowron et al. (2017) study
an aspect of the Liquid Feedback platform concerning the order in which proposals are
ranked and by which they are brought to the attention of the community. Boldi et al.
(2011) investigate applications of variants of the liquid democracy voting method (called
viscous democracy) to recommender systems. Brill (2018) presents some research direc-
tions in the context of liquid democracy. A general, more philosophical discussion of liquid
democracy is provided by Blum & Zuber (2016).
More directly related to our investigations is the work by Christoff & Grossi (2017)
and, especially, by Kahng et al. (2018). The first paper studies liquid democracy as an
aggregator—a function mapping profiles of binary opinions to a collective opinion—in the
judgment aggregation and binary voting tradition (Grossi & Pigozzi, 2014; Endriss, 2016).
The focus of that paper are the unintended effects that transferable proxies may have due
to delegation cycles, and due to the failure of rationality constraints normally satisfied by
direct voting.
The second paper addresses one of the most cited selling arguments for liquid democ-
racy: delegable proxies guarantee that better informed agents can exercise more weight on
group decisions, thereby increasing their quality. Specifically, Kahng et al. (2018) study
the level of accuracy that can be guaranteed by liquid democracy (based on vote delega-
2
tion with weighted majority) vs. direct voting by majority. Their key result consists in
showing that no ‘local’ procedure to select proxies can guarantee that liquid democracy
is, at the same time, never less accurate (in large enough graphs) and sometimes strictly
more accurate than direct voting. In contrast to their work, we assume that agents incur
costs (effort) when voting directly, and on that basis we develop a game-theoretic model.
Also, we assume agents aim at tracking their own type rather than an external ground
truth, although we do assume such a restriction in our simulations to better highlight how
the two models are related and to obtain insights applicable to both.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Types, Individual Accuracy and Proximity
We are concerned with a finite set of agents (or voters, or players) N = {1, . . . , n} having
to decide whether x = 1 or x = 0. For each agent one of these two outcomes is better, but
the agent is not necessarily aware which one. We refer to this hidden optimal outcome as
the type of agent i and denote it by τi ∈ {0, 1}. Agents want to communicate their type
truthfully to the voting mechanism, but they know it only imperfectly. This is captured
by the accuracy qi of an agent i: qi determines the likelihood that, if i votes directly, she
votes according to her type τi. We assume that an agent’s accuracy is always ≥ 0.5, i.e.,
at least as good as a coin toss.
We distinguish two settings depending on whether the agents’ types are deterministic
or probabilistic. A deterministic type profile T = 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉 simply collects each agent’s
type. In probabilistic type profiles types are independent random variables drawn according
to a distribution P. Given a probabilistic type profile, the likelihood that any two agents
i, j ∈ N are of the same type is called the proximity pi,j where pi,j = P(τ(i) = τ(j)) =
P(τ(i) = 1) · P(τ(j) = 1) + (1 − P(τ(i) = 1)) · (1 − P(τ(j) = 1)). In the probabilistic
setting we assume agents know such value although, importantly, they do not know P. In
a deterministic type profile, we have pi,j = 1 if τi = τj and pi,j = 0 otherwise. Following
standard equilibrium theory, our theoretical results assume agents act as if they have
access to the accuracy of each agent. More realistically, in our simulations we assume
agents have access to such information only with respect to neighbors on an underlying
interaction structure.
2.2 Interaction Structure and Delegations
Agents are nodes in a network (directed graph) represented by a relation R ⊆ N2. For
i ∈ N the neighborhood of i in 〈N,R〉 is denoted R(i), i.e., the agents that are directly
connected to i. Agents have the choice of either voting themselves, thereby relying solely
on their own accuracy, or delegating to an agent in their neighborhood. A delegation
profile is a vector d = 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ Nn. Given a delegation profile d we denote by di
the proxy selected by i in d. Clearly a delegation profile can be viewed as a functional
graph on N or, equivalently, as a map in d : N → N where d(i) = di. When the iterated
application of d from i reaches a fixed point we denote such fixed point as d∗i and call it
i’s guru (in d). In the following, we write N∗ to denote the set of voters whose delegation
does not lay on a path ending on a cycle, i.e., the set of voters i for which d∗i exists. We
write d′ = (d−i, j) as a short form for d′ = 〈d1, . . . , di−1, j, di+1, . . . , dn〉.
As agents may only be able to observe and interact with their direct network neighbors,
structural properties of the interaction network may play a role in the model dynamics. In
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our simulations we will focus on undirected graphs (that is, R will be assumed to be sym-
metric, as social ties are normally mutual) consisting of one single connected component
(that is, N2 is included in the reflexive transitive closure of R). Under these assumptions,
we consider four typical network structures that are well represented in the literature on
social network analysis (cf. Jackson 2008): 1) the random network, in which each pair of
nodes has a given probability of being connected (Erdo¨s & Re´nyi, 1959); 2) the regular
network, in which all nodes have the same degree; 3) the small world network, which
features a small average path length and high clustering (Watts & Strogatz, 1998); and 4)
the scale free network, which exhibits a power law degree distribution (Baraba´si & Albert,
1999).4
3 A Model of Rational Delegations
3.1 Individual Accuracy under Delegable Proxy
Each agent i has to choose between two options: either to vote herself with accuracy qi
or to delegate, thereby inheriting the accuracy of another voter (unless i is involved in a
delegation cycle). These choices are recorded in the delegation profile d and can be used
to compute the individual accuracy for each agent i ∈ N∗ as follows:
q∗i (d) =
{
qd∗i · pi,d∗i + (1− qd∗i ) · (1− pi,d∗i ) if i ∈ N∗
0.5 if i /∈ N∗ (1)
In Equation (1) i’s accuracy equals the likelihood that i’s guru has the same type and
votes accurately plus the likelihood that i’s guru has the opposite type and fails to vote
accurately. Note that if i votes directly, i.e., di = i, then q
∗
i (d) = qi. Observe that if
i’s delegation leads to a cycle (i /∈ N∗), i’s accuracy is set to 0.5. The rationale for this
assumption is the following. If an agent delegates into a cycle, even though she knows
her own accuracy and she actively engages with the voting mechanism by expressing a
delegation, she fails to pass information about her type to the mechanism. No information
is therefore available to decide about her type.
It may be worth observing that, by Equation (1), in a deterministic type profile we
have that pi,j ∈ {0, 1} and therefore i’s accuracy reduces to: qd∗i if i ∈ N∗ and τ(i) = τ(d∗i );
1− qd∗(i) if i ∈ N∗ and τ(i) 6= τ(d∗i ); and 0.5 if i /∈ N∗.
Before introducing our game theoretic analysis, we make the following observation.
Agents have at their disposal an intuitive strategy to improve their accuracy: simply
delegate to a more accurate neighbor. We say that a delegation profile d is positive if for
all j ∈ N either dj = j or q∗j (d) > qj . Furthermore, we say that a delegation from i to a
neighbor j is locally positive if qj · pi,j + (1− qj) · (1− pi,j) > qi.
Proposition 1. Let d be a positive delegation profile. Further, let s, t ∈ N , ds = s, and
d′ = (d−s, t), i.e., agent s votes directly in d and delegates to t in d′. If the delegation
from s to t is locally positive, then d′ is positive (proof in Appendix A).
However, locally positive delegations do not necessarily correspond to optimal del-
egations. This can be easily seen in an example where agent i is not a neighbor of a
very competent agent j, but would have to delegate via an intermediate agent k (who
delegates to j). If this intermediate agent k has a lower accuracy than i, then the dele-
gation from i to k would not be locally positive, even though it is an optimal choice. So
4Although random and regular graphs are not generally applicable to real-world settings, they serve as
a useful baseline to illustrate the effects of network structure on delegations.
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utility-maximization may require information which is inherently non-local (accuracy of
‘far’ agents).
3.2 Delegation Games
We assume that each agent i has to invest an effort ei to manifest her accuracy qi. If
she delegates, she does not have to spend effort. Agents aim therefore at maximizing
the trade-off between the accuracy they can achieve (either by voting directly or through
proxy) and the effort they spend. Under this assumption, the binary decision set-up
with delegable proxy we outlined above can be used to define a natural game—called
delegation game—G = 〈N,P, R,Σi, ui〉, with i ∈ N , where N is the set of agents, P is the
(possibly degenerate) distribution from which the types of the agents in N are drawn, R
the underlying network as defined above, Σi ∈ N is the set of strategies of agent i (voting,
or choosing a specific proxy), and
ui(d) =
{
q∗i (d) if di 6= i
qi − ei if di = i
(2)
is agent i’s utility function. The utility i extracts from a delegation profile equals the
accuracy she inherits through proxy or, if she votes, her accuracy minus the effort spent.5
In delegation games we assume that qi − ei ≥ 0.5 for all i ∈ N . This is because if
qi − ei < 0.5, then i would prefer a random effortless choice over taking a decision with
effort.
A few comments about the setup of Equation (2) are in order. First of all, as stated
earlier, we assume agents to be truthful. They do not aim at maximizing the chance
their type wins the vote, but rather to relay their type to the mechanism as accurately
as possible.6 Secondly, notice that the utility an agent extracts from a delegation profile
may equal the accuracy of a random coin toss when the agent’s delegation ends up into
a delegation cycle (cf. Equation (1)). If this happens the agent fails to relay information
about her type, even though she acted in order to do so. This justifies the fact that 0.5 is
also the lowest payoff attainable in a delegation game.
The following classes of delegation games will be used in the paper: games with de-
terministic profiles, i.e., where P is degenerate and all players are assigned a crisp type
from {0, 1}; homogeneous games, where all players have the same (deterministic) type;7
and effortless voting games, where for each i ∈ N we have ei = 0.
As an example, a homogeneous game in matrix form is given in Table 1, where N =
{1, 2}, R = N2 and the distribution yields the deterministic type profile T = 〈1, 1〉.
Interestingly, if we assume that qi − ei > 0.5 with i ∈ {1, 2}, and that8 q−i > qi − ei (i.e.,
the opponent’s accuracy is higher than the player’s individual accuracy minus her effort),
then the game shares the ordinal preference structure of the class of anti-coordination
games: players need to avoid coordination on the same strategy (one should vote and the
other delegate), with two coordination outcomes (both players voting or both delegating)
of which the second (the delegation cycle) is worst for both players. Notice that, were the
5No utility is accrued for gaining voting power in our model.
6Notice however that our modeling of agents’ utility remains applicable in this form even if agents are
not truthful but the underlying voting rule makes truthfulness a dominant strategy—such as majority in
the binary voting setting used here.
7This is the type of interaction studied, albeit not game-theoretically, by Kahng et al. (2018) and
normally assumed by jury theorems (Grofman et al., 1983).
8We use here the usual notation −i to denote i’s opponent.
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vote delegate (to 1)
vote q1−e1, q2−e2 q1 − e1, q1
delegate (to 2) q2, q2 − e2 0.5, 0.5
Table 1: A two-player delegation game. The row player is agent 1 and the column player
is agent 2.
underlying network not complete (i.e., R ⊂ N2), the matrix would be shrunk by removing
the rows and columns corresponding to the delegation options no longer available.
The introduction of effort has significant consequences on the delegation behavior of
voters, and we will study it in depth in the coming sections. It is worth noting immediately
that the assumptions of Proposition 1 no longer apply, since agents may prefer to make
delegations that are not locally positive due to the decreased utility of voting directly.
3.3 Existence of Equilibria in Delegation Games
In this section we study the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria (NE) in two
classes of delegation games. NE describe how ideally rational voters would resolve the
effort/accuracy trade-off. Of course, such voters have common knowledge of the delega-
tion game structure—including, therefore, common knowledge of the accuracies of ‘distant’
agents in the underlying network. Our simulations will later lift some of such epistemic
assumptions built into NE.
Deterministic Types In the following we provide a NE existence result for games with
deterministic type profiles.
Theorem 1. Delegation games with deterministic type profiles always have a (pure strat-
egy) NE.
Proof. First of all, observe that since the profile is deterministic, for each pair of agents
i and j, pi,j ∈ {0, 1}. The proof is by construction. First, we partition the set of agents
N into N1 = {i ∈ N | τ(i) = 1} and N0 = {i ∈ N | τ(i) = 0}. We consider these two sets
separately; without loss of generality let us consider N1. Further we consider the network
R1 = {(i, j) ∈ N1 × N1 : (i, j) ∈ R}. Since (N1, R1) can be seen as a directed graph,
we can partition it into Strongly Connected Components (SCCs). If we shrink each SCC
into a single vertex, we obtain the condensation of this graph; note that such a graph is a
directed acyclic graph (DAG). We construct a delegation profile d by traversing this DAG
bottom up, i.e., starting with leaf SCCs.
Let S ⊆ N1 be a set of agents corresponding to a leaf SCC in the condensation
DAG. We choose an agent i in S that has maximum qi − ei. Everyone in S (including i)
delegates to i. Now let S ⊆ N1 be a set of agents corresponding to an inner node SCC
in the condensation DAG and assume that we have already defined the delegation for all
SCCs that can be reached from S. As before, we identify an agent i ∈ S with maximum
qi − ei. Further, let T ⊆ N1 \ S be the set of all voters j that can be reached from S in
(N1, R1), and for which q
∗
j > qi−ei. We distinguish two cases. (i) If T 6= ∅, then we choose
an agent k ∈ T with q∗k = maxj∈T q∗j and all agents in S directly or indirectly delegate to
k. (ii) If T = ∅, all agents in S delegate to i. This concludes our construction (as for N0
the analogous construction applies); let d be the corresponding delegation profile.
It remains to verify that this is indeed a NE: Let i be some agent in an SCC S,
and, without loss of generality, let i ∈ N1. Observe that since we have a deterministic
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profile, if agent i changes her delegation to j, then i’s utility changes to q∗j (d) if i ∈ N1
and 1 − q∗j (d) if i ∈ N0. First, note that for all agents k ∈ N , q∗k(d) ≥ qk − ek ≥ 0.5.
Hence, we can immediately exclude that for agent i delegating to an agent in j ∈ N0 is
(strictly) beneficial, as it would yield an accuracy of at most 1 − q∗j ≤ 0.5. Towards a
contradiction assume there is a beneficial deviation to an agent j ∈ N1, i.e., there is an
agent j ∈ R(i) ∩N1 with q∗j (d) > q∗i (d). Let us now consider the three cases: (1) di = i,
(2) d∗i ∈ S but di 6= i, and (3) d∗i /∈ S. In case (1), everyone in S delegates to i. Hence, if
j ∈ S, a cycle would occur yielding a utility of 0.5, which is not sufficient for a beneficial
deviation. If a delegation to j /∈ S is possible but was not chosen, then by construction
q∗j ≤ qi − ei and hence this deviation is not beneficial. We conclude that in case (1) such
an agent j cannot exist. In case (2), everyone in S delegates to d∗i . Hence, if j ∈ S, then
d∗j = d
∗
i , a contradiction. If j /∈ S, the same reasoning as before applies and hence also
here we obtain a contradiction. In case (3), by construction, d∗i /∈ S had been chosen to
maximise accuracy, hence j ∈ S. Since for all k ∈ S, d∗k = d∗i , only a deviation to i itself
can be beneficial, i.e., j = i. However, since d∗i was chosen because q
∗
d∗(i) > qi − ei, no
beneficial deviation is possible.
It follows that also homogeneous games always have NE.
Effortless Voting Effortless voting (ei = 0 for all i ∈ N) is applicable whenever effort
is spent in advance of the decision and further accuracy improvements are not possible.
Theorem 2. Delegation games with effortless voting always have a (pure strategy) NE.
Proof. We prove this statement by showing that the following procedure obtains a NE: We
start with a strategy profile in which all players vote directly, i.e., player i’s strategy is i.
Then, we iteratively allow players to choose their individual best response strategy to the
current strategy profile. Players act sequentially in arbitrary order. If there are no more
players that can improve their utility by changing their strategy, we have found a NE. We
prove convergence of this procedure by showing that a best response that increases the
player’s utility never decreases the utility of other players.
We proceed by induction. Assume that all previous best responses have not reduced
any players’ utility (IH). Assume player i now chooses a best response that increases
her utility. Let d be the delegation profile; further, let d∗i = s. By assumption, i’s utility
started with qi−ei = qi and has not decreased since, i.e., ui(d) ≥ qi. Since i’s best response
strictly increases i’s utility, it cannot be a delegation to herself. So let a delegation to
j 6= i be i’s best response and consider profile d′ = (d−i, j). Further, let d∗j = t, i.e., i now
delegates to j and by transitivity to t, i.e., d′∗i = d
′∗
j = t. Let k be some player other than i.
We define the delegation path of k as the sequence (d(k),d(d(k)),d(d(d(k))), . . . ). If k’s
delegation path does not contain i, then k’s utility remains unchanged, i.e., uk(d
′) ≥ uk(d).
If k’s delegation path contains i, then k now delegates by transitivity to t, i.e., we have
d∗k = s and d
′∗
k = t. By Equation (2), we have
uk(d) = qs · pk,s + (1− qs) · (1− pk,s) and (3)
uk(d
′) = qt · pk,t + (1− qt) · (1− pk,t). (4)
We have to show that k’s utility does not decrease, i.e., uk(d
′) ≥ uk(d), under the as-
sumption that i chooses a best response, i.e., ui(d
′) > ui(d), with:
ui(d) = qs · pi,s + (1− qs) · (1− pi,s) and (5)
ui(d
′) = qt · pi,t + (1− qt) · (1− pi,t). (6)
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In the following we will often use the fact that, for a, b ∈ [0, 1], if ab+ (1− a)(1− b) ≥ 0.5,
then either a, b ∈ [0, 0.5] or a, b ∈ [0.5, 1]. By IH, since accuracies are always at least 0.5, it
holds that ui(d) ≥ qi ≥ 0.5 and by Equation (5) we have qs · pi,s + (1− qs) · (1− pi,s) ≥ 0.5
and hence pi,s ≥ 0.5. Analogously, Equation (3) implies that pk,s ≥ 0.5.
Furthermore, we use the fact that
pk,i = pk,sps,i + (1− pk,s)(1− ps,i) + (−2(2xk − 1) · (2xi − 1) · (xs − 1)xs) (7)
where xj = P(τ(j) = 1) for j ∈ {k, i, s}. Observe that, by the definition of utility in
Equation (2), the assumptions made on d and d′, and the fact that for a, b ∈ [0, 1], if
ab+ (1− a)(1− b) ≥ 0.5, then either a, b ∈ [0, 0.5] or a, b ∈ [0.5, 1]. So we have that either
xj ≥ 0.5 for j ∈ {k, i, s}, or xj ≤ 0.5 for j ∈ {k, i, s}. We work on the first case. The
other case is symmetric. Let also γk,s,i = −2(2xk − 1) · (2xi − 1) · (xs − 1)xs. From the
above it follows that 0.5 ≥ γk,i,s ≥ 0. Furthermore, given that pi,s = ps,i ≥ 0.5, we can
also conclude that pk,i ≥ 0.5. Now by substituting
pk,s = pk,ipi,s + (1− pk,i)(1− pi,s) + (−2(2xk − 1) · (2xs − 1) · (xi − 1)xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
γk,i,s
)
in Equation (3), we obtain
uk(d) = (2pk,i − 1)(
ui(d)︷ ︸︸ ︷
2qspi,s − qs − pi,s + 1) + 1− pk,i + γk,i,s(2qs − 1). (8)
Similarly, using the appropriate instantiation of Equation (7) for xj with j ∈ {k, i, t},
by substituting pk,i · pi,t + (1− pk,i)(1− pi,t) + γk,i,t for pk,t in Equation (4) we obtain
uk(d
′) = (2pk,i − 1) · (
ui(d
′)︷ ︸︸ ︷
2qtpi,t − qt − pi,t + 1) + 1− pk,i + γk,i,t(2qt − 1). (9)
Now observe that, since pk,i ≥ 0.5 we have that (2pk,i − 1) ≥ 0. It remains to compare
γk,i,s(2qs − 1) with γk,i,t(2qt − 1), showing the latter is greater than the former. Observe
that both expressions have a positive sign. We use the fact that ab + (1 − a)(1 − b) <
cd + (1 − c)(1 − d) implies cd > ab under the assumption that a, b, c, d ∈ [0.5, 1]. On the
basis of this, and given that ui(d
′) > ui(d), we obtain that qs · pi,s < qt · pi,t and therefore
that qs · xs < qt · xt, from which we can conclude that
( γk,i,s︷ ︸︸ ︷−2(2xk − 1) · (2xs − 1) · (xi − 1)xi ) · (2qs − 1)
<
(−2(2xk − 1) · (2xt − 1) · (xi − 1)xi︸ ︷︷ ︸
γk,i,t
) · (2qt − 1).
It follows that the assumption ui(d
′) > ui(d) (player i chose a best response that increased
her utility) together with Equations (8) and (9) implies that uk(d
′) > uk(d) (and a fortiori
that uk(d
′) ≥ uk(d)). We have therefore shown that if some player chooses a best response,
the utility of other players does not decrease. This completes the proof.
Discussion The existence of NE in general delegation games remains an interesting open
problem. It should be noted that the proof strategies of both Theorems 1 and 2 do not
work in the general case. Without a clear dichotomy of type it is not possible to assign
delegations for all agents in an SCC (as we do in the proof of Theorem 1). And the key
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property upon which the proof of Theorem 2 hinges (that a best response of an agent does
not decrease the utility of other agents) fails in the general case due to the presence of non-
zero effort. Finally, it should also be observed that Theorem 2 (as well as Proposition 1)
essentially depend on the assumption that types are independent random variables. If
this is not the case (e.g., because voters’ preferences are correlated), delegation chains can
become undesirable.
Example 1. Consider the following example with agents 1, 2 and 3. The probability
distribution P is defined as P(τ(1) = 1 ∧ τ(2) = 1 ∧ τ(3) = 0) = 0.45, P(τ(1) = 0 ∧ τ(2) =
1 ∧ τ(3) = 1) = 0.45, and P(τ(1) = 1 ∧ τ(2) = 1 ∧ τ(3) = 1) = 0.1. Consequently,
p1,2 = 0.55, p2,3 = 0.55, and p1,3 = 0.1. Let us assume that the agents’ accuracies are
q1 = 0.5001, q2 = 0.51, and q3 = 0.61. A delegation from agent 1 to 2 is locally positive as
q2 · p1,2 + (1− q2) · (1− p1,2) = 0.501 > q1. Furthermore, a delegation from 2 to 3 is locally
positive as q3 · p2,3 + (1 − q3) · (1 − p2,3) = 0.511 > q2. However, the resulting delegation
from 1 to 3 is not positive since q3 · p1,3 + (1− q3) · (1− p1,3) = 0.412.
3.4 Quality of Equilibria in Delegation Games
In delegation games players are motivated to maximize the tradeoff between the accuracy
they acquire and the effort they spend for it. A natural measure for the quality of a
delegation profile is, therefore, how accurate or informed a random voter becomes as
a result of the delegations in the profile, that is, the average accuracy (i.e., q¯∗(d) =
1
n
∑
i∈N q
∗
i (d)) players enjoy in that profile. One can also consider the utilitarian social
welfare SW(d) =
∑
i∈N ui(d) of a delegation profile d. This relates to average accuracy
as follows:
q¯∗(d) =
SW(d) +
∑
i|d(i)=i ei
n
.
It can immediately be noticed that equilibria do not necessarily maximize average
accuracy. On the contrary, in the following example NE yields an average accuracy of
close to 0.5, whereas an average accuracy of almost 1 is achievable.
Example 2. Consider an n-player delegation game where all players have the same type
and (i, j) ∈ R for all j and all i > 1, i.e., player 1 is a sink in R and cannot delegate to
anyone, but all others can delegate to everyone. Further, we have e1 = 0 and ei = 0.5− 
for i ≥ 2. The respective accuracies are q1 = 0.5 + 2 and qi = 1. If player i ≥ 2 does
not delegate, her utility is 0.5 + . Hence, it is always more desirable to delegate to player
1 (which yields a utility of 0.5 + 2 for i). Consider now the profiles in which all players
delegate to player 1 (either directly or transitively). Player 1 can only vote directly (with
utility 0.5 + 2). All such profiles are NE with average accuracy 0.5 + 2. If, however,
some player j ≥ 2 chose to vote herself, all players (except 1) would delegate to j thereby
obtaining an average accuracy of 1− 0.5−2n , which converges to 1 for n→∞. This is not
a NE, as j could increase her utility by delegating to 1.
The findings of the example can be made more explicit by considering a variant of
the price of anarchy for delegation games, based on the above notion of average accuracy.
That is, for a given delegation game G, the price of anarchy (PoA) of G is given by
PoA(G) =
maxd∈Nn q¯∗(d)
mind∈NE(G) q¯∗(d)
,
where NE(G) denotes the set of pure-strategy NE of G.
9
Fact 1. PoA is bounded below by 1 and above by 2 (see Apendix A).
An informative performance metrics for liquid democracy is the difference between
the group accuracy after delegations versus the group accuracy achieved by direct voting.
This measure, called gain, was introduced and studied by Kahng et al. (2018). Here we
adapt it to our setting as follows: G(G) =
(
mind∈NE(G) q¯∗(d)
)− q¯ where q¯ = q¯∗(〈1, . . . , n〉).
That is, the gain in the delegation game G is the average accuracy of the worst NE minus
the average accuracy of the profile in which no voter delegates. It turns out that the full
performance range is possible:
Fact 2. G is bounded below by −0.5 and above by 0.5 (see Apendix A).
The above bounds for PoA and gain provide only a very partial picture of the perfor-
mance of liquid democracy when modeled as a delegation game. The next section provides
a more fine-grained perspective on the effects of delegations.
4 Simulations
We simulate the delegation game described above in a variety of settings. We restrict
ourselves to homogeneous games. This allows us to relate our results to those of Kahng
et al. (2018). Our experiments serve to both verify and extend the theoretical results of
the previous section. In particular we simulate the best response dynamics employed in
the proof of Theorem 2 and show that these dynamics converge even in the setting with
effort, which we could not establish analytically. In addition, we investigate the dynamics
of a one-shot game scenario, in which all agents need to select their proxy simultaneously
at once.
Setup We generate graphs of size N = 250 of each of the four topologies random,
regular, small world, and scale free, for different average degrees, while ensuring that the
graph is connected. Agents’ individual accuracy and effort are initialized randomly with
qi ∈ [0.5, 1] and qi − ei ≥ 0.5. We average results over 2500 simulations for each setting
(25 randomly generated graphs × 100 initializations). Agents correctly observe their own
accuracy and effort, and the accuracy of their neighbors. The game is homogeneous, so
proximities are 1.
Each agent i selects from her neighborhood R(i) (which includes i herself) the agent
j that maximizes her expected utility following Equation (2). We compare two scenarios.
The iterated best response scenario follows the procedure of the proof of Theorem 2, in
which agents sequentially update their proxy to best-respond to the current profile d using
knowledge of their neighbors’ accuracy q∗i (d). In the one-shot game scenario all agents
choose their proxy only once, do so simultaneously, and based only on their neighbors’
accuracy. The latter setup captures more closely the epistemic limitations that agents face
in liquid democracy.
4.1 Iterated Best Response Dynamics
These experiments complement our existence theorems. They offer insights into the effects
of delegations on average voter’s accuracy in equilibrium, and on the effects of different
network structures on how such equilibria are achieved.
We initialize qi ∼ N (0.75, 0.05) and first investigate the case in which ei = 0 for
all i (effortless voting). Across all combinations of network types and average degrees
ranging from 4 to 24, we find that the best response dynamics converges, as predicted by
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Table 2: Total number of best response updates by individual agents and corresponding
full passes over the network required for convergence. Reported are the mean (std.dev.)
over all network types. Note: not all agents update their delegation at each full pass,
but any single update requires an additional pass to check whether the best response still
holds.
Degree 4 8 12 16 20 24
BR updates 298.1 261.7 254.2 251.6 250.6 250.0
(effortless) (18.2) (11.1) (6.9) (4.5) (3.3) (2.6)
Full passes 3.6 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.5
(effortless) (0.5) (0.1) (0.2) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5)
BR updates 294.7 259.4 252.9 250.9 250.2 249.9
(with effort) (18.4) (10.6) (6.6) (4.8) (4.9) (4.3)
Full passes 3.6 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.4
(with effort) (0.5) (0.3) (0.6) (0.8) (0.9) (1.0)
Table 3: Comparing the maximum accuracy across all agents and the mean accuracy
under delegation d for different network degrees, averaged across network types. The
differences are statistically significant (paired t-test, p = 0.05).
Degree 4 8 12 16 20 24
maxj qj 0.8908 0.8908 0.8904 0.8909 0.8904 0.8910
q¯∗(d) 0.8906 0.8903 0.8897 0.8899 0.8890 0.8893
Theorem 2, and does so optimally with d∗i = arg maxj qj for all i. We observe minimal
differences between network types, but see a clear inverse relation between average degree
and the number of iterations required to converge (Table 2, top). Intuitively, more densely
connected networks facilitate agents in identifying their optimal proxies (further details
are provided in Appendix B).
We accumulate results across all network types and compare the effortless setting to the
case in which effort is taken into account. When we include effort ei ∼ N (0.025, 0.01), we
still observe convergence in all cases and, interestingly, the number of iterations required
does not change significantly (Table 2, bottom). Although the process no longer results in
an optimal equilibrium, each case still yields a single guru j with qj ≈ maxk qk (less than
1% error) for all k ∈ N . In this scenario, the inclusion of effort means that a best response
update of agent i no longer guarantees non-decreasing accuracy and utility for all other
agents, which was a key property in the proof of Theorem 2. This effect becomes stronger
as the average network degree increases, and as a result higher degree networks allow a
greater discrepancy between the maximal average accuracy achievable and the average
accuracy obtained at stabilization (Table 3).
In lower degree graphs (e.g. degree 4) we further observe differences in convergence
speed between the four different network types which coincide with differences between
the average path lengths in those graphs: a shorter average distance between nodes yields
a lower number of best response updates. This is intuitive, as larger distances between
nodes mean longer delegation chains, but we have not yet conducted statistical tests to
verify this hypothesis.
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tance between nodes yields a lower number of best response
updates.9 This is intuitive, as larger distances between nodes
mean longer delegation chains, but we have not yet con-
ducted statistical tests to verify this hypothesis.
One-Shot Delegation Games
Here we study one-shot interaction in a delegation game:
all agents select their proxy (possibly themselves) simulta-
neously among their neighbors; no further response is pos-
sible. This contrasts the previous scenario in which agents
could iteratively improve their choice based on the choices
of others. While Kahng, Mackenzie, and Procaccia (2018)
study a probabilistic model, we instead assume that agents
deterministically select as proxy the agent j 2 R(i) that
maximizes their utility, as above. We compare q¯ and q¯⇤ (the
average network accuracy without and with delegation, re-
spectively), as well as the probability of a correct majority
vote under both direct democracy PD and liquid democracy
PL where gurus carry as weight the number of agents for
whom they act as proxy. The difference PL   PD is the no-
tion of gain (Kahng, Mackenzie, and Procaccia 2018). In
line with Condorcet’s jury theorem (see for instance Grof-
man, Owen, and Feld 1983) PD ! 1 as N ! 1, and in-
deed for N = 250 we obtain PD ⇡ 1.
First we again look at the effortless setting. Figure 1 (top)
shows both metrics for the four different network types and
for different average degrees. We observe that while q¯⇤(d)
increases as the network degree increases (and in fact is al-
ways higher than q¯ without delegation), the probability of
a correct majority outcome, PL, simultaneously decreases.
This confirms the analysis of Kahng, Mackenzie, and Pro-
caccia (2018). We also observe that the number of gurus
decreases exponentially as the degree increases (Figure 2,
left). Simply put, giving all voting weight to a small group
of gurus increases the chance of an incorrect majority vote,
assuming that gurus have a less than perfect accuracy.
When we include effort (Figure 1, bottom), thereby mov-
ing away from the model of Kahng, Mackenzie, and Procac-
cia (2018), we observe a drastic decrease in average network
accuracy combined with a lower probability of a correct ma-
jority outcome under liquid democracy, with both decreas-
ing as network degree increases. The main reason is the ex-
istence of delegation cycles in this case. This contrasts the
best response setting above where agents could iteratively
reconsider their choice of proxy and thus avoid cycles. Now,
even with relatively low effort (mean 0.025), up to half of all
agents are stuck in a cycle (and thereby fail to pass informa-
tion about their type) when degree increases. This confirms
results on the probability of delegation cycles from Christoff
and Grossi (2017) and stresses the importance of cycle reso-
lution in concrete implementations of liquid democracy such
as Liquid Feedback.
Finally, Figure 1 highlights differences between the four
network types. Scale free networks yield a lower probability
of a correct majority outcome across all degrees, as well as
a larger number of gurus with a lower average accuracy and
9More detailed results supporting this finding are presented in
the supplementary material, Appendix B.
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Figure 1: Top: Without effort. Bottom: With effort ei ⇠
N (0.025, 0.01). Left: average network accuracy under liq-
uid democracy. The solid (dashed) line shows the mean (std.
dev.) of q; the dotted line showsmaxi qi. Right: probability
of a correct majority vote under liquid democracy.
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Figure 2: Percentage of guru nodes under d (left) and mean
distance between (non-guru) nodes and their gurus (right).
longer delegation chains (Figure 2, right). Intuitively, this
indicates that one-shot interaction in scale free networks is
more likely to end up in a local optimum. In contrast, small
world networks have short average distances and thus agents
are more likely to be close to their optimal guru.
Conclusions and Future Work
The paper introduced delegation games as a first game-
theoretic model of liquid democracy. Both our theoretical
and experimental results showed that voting effort is a key
ingredient for understanding how delegations form and what
their effects are. Our empirical findings provided further in-
sights into the influence of interaction networks on the qual-
ity of collective decisions in liquid democracy.
The paper opens up several directions of research. A gen-
eral NE existence theorem is the main open question. The
framework can then be generalized along natural lines, e.g.:
Figure 1: Top: Without effort. Bottom: With effort ei ∼ N (0.025, 0.01). Left: mean
accuracy under liquid democracy, q¯∗(d). The solid (dashed) line shows the mean (std.
dev.) of the initial accuracy q; the dotted line shows maxi qi. Right: probability of a
correct majority vote under d.
4.2 One-Shot Delegation Games
Here we study one-shot interactions in a delegation game: all agents select their proxy
(possibly themselves) simultaneously among their neighbors; no further response is possi-
ble. This contrasts the previous scenario in which agents could iteratively improve their
choice based on the choices of others. While Kahng et al. (2018) study a probabilistic
model, we instead assume that agents deterministically select as proxy the agent j ∈ R(i)
that maximizes their utility, as above. We compare q¯ and q¯∗ (the average network accuracy
without and with delegation, respectively), as well as the probability of a correct major-
ity vote under both direct democracy PD and liquid democracy PL where gurus carry as
weight the number of agents for whom they act as proxy. The difference PL−PD is again
similar to the notion of gain (Kahng et al., 2018). In line with Condorcet’s jury theorem
(see for instance Grofman et al. 1983) PD → 1 as N → ∞, and indeed for N = 250 we
obtain PD ≈ 1.
First we again look at the effortless setting. Figure 1 (top) shows both metrics for
the four different network types and for different average degrees. We observe that while
q¯∗(d) increases as the network degree increases (and in fact is always higher than q¯ without
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Figure 2: Percentage of guru nodes under d (left) and mean distance between (non-guru)
nodes and their gurus (right).
delegation), the probability of a correct majority outcome, PL, simultaneously decreases.
This confirms the analysis of Kahng et al. (2018). We also observe that the number of
gurus decreases exponentially as the degree increases (Figure 2, left). Simply put, giving
all voting weight to a small group of gurus increases the chance of an incorrect majority
vote, assuming that gurus have a less than perfect accuracy.
When we include effort (Figure 1, bottom), thereby moving away from the model of
Kahng et al. (2018), we observe a drastic decrease in average network accuracy combined
with a lower probability of a correct majority outcome under liquid democracy, with both
decreasing as network degree increases. The main reason is the existence of delegation
cycles in this case. This contrasts the best response setting above where agents could
iteratively reconsider their choice of proxy and thus avoid cycles. Now, even with relatively
low effort (mean 0.025), up to half of all agents are stuck in a cycle (and thereby fail to
pass information about their type) when the degree increases. This confirms results on the
probability of delegation cycles from Christoff & Grossi (2017) and stresses the importance
of cycle resolution in concrete implementations of liquid democracy.
Figure 1 further highlights differences between the four network types. Scale free
networks yield a lower probability of a correct majority outcome across all degrees, as
well as a larger number of gurus with a lower average accuracy and longer delegation
chains (Figure 2, right). Intuitively, this indicates that one-shot interactions in scale free
networks are more likely to end up in a local optimum. In contrast, small world networks
have short average distances and thus agents are more likely to be close to their optimal
guru. Finally, our experiments highlight a key feature of liquid democracy: the trade-off
between a reduction in (total) effort against a loss in average voting accuracy.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
The paper introduced delegation games as a first game-theoretic model of liquid democ-
racy. Both our theoretical and experimental results showed that voting effort is a key
ingredient for understanding how delegations form and what their effects are. Our em-
pirical findings provided further insights into the influence of interaction networks on the
quality of collective decisions in liquid democracy.
The paper opens up several directions of research. A general NE existence theorem
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is the main open question. Our model can then be generalized in many directions, e.g.:
by making agents’ utility dependent on voting outcomes; by dropping the independence
assumption on agents’ types; or by assuming the voting mechanism has better than 0.5
accuracy in identifying the types of agents involved in cycles.
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A Proofs of Proposition 1, Fact 1, and Fact 2
Here we provide the proofs op Proposition 1, Fact 1, and Fact 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. First we show that q∗s(d′) > q∗s(d) = qs. If dt = t, the statement
holds since the delegation from s to t is locally positive. Otherwise, let dt = r. Since d is
positive, we know that
q∗t (d) = qr · pt,r + (1− qr) · (1− pt,r) > qt.
Now let xi = P(τ(i) = 1) for i ∈ {s, t, r}. Since types are independent random variables,
it holds that pi,j = xixj + (1− xi)(1− xj). Using this fact, we can verify that
ps,r = ps,tpt,r + (1− ps,t)(1− pt,r)
+ (−2(2xs − 1) · (2xr − 1) · (xt − 1)xt).
(10)
We now want to prove that
−2(2xs − 1) · (2xr − 1) · (xt − 1)xt ≥ 0. (11)
First note that a locally positive delegation from i to j implies that pi,j ≥ 0.5 (since
qi, qj ≥ 0.5); hence ps,t ≥ 0.5 and pt,r ≥ 0.5. Second, observe that for any a, b ∈ [0, 1],
if ab + (1 − a)(1 − b) ≥ 0.5, then either a, b ∈ [0, 0.5] or a, b ∈ [0.5, 1]. Now, since
ps,t = xsxt + (1− xs)(1− xt) ≥ 0.5 and pt,r = xtxr + (1− xt)(1− xr) ≥ 0.5, we conclude
that either xs, xt, xr ∈ [0, 0.5] or xs, xt, xr ∈ [0.5, 1]. In both cases Equation (11) holds.
From Equation (11) and Equation (12) it follows that:
ps,r ≥ ps,tpt,r + (1− ps,t)(1− pt,r)
= 2ps,tpt,r − ps,t − pt,r + 1.
(12)
Thus we obtain:
q∗s(d
′) = qrps,r + (1− qr)(1− ps,r)
= 2qrps,r − qr − ps,r + 1
≥ 2qr︸︷︷︸
≥1
(2ps,tpt,r − pt,r − ps,t + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ ps,r by Equation (12)
)− qr − (2ps,tpt,r − pt,r − ps,t + 1) + 1
= 4qrps,tpt,r − 2qrpt,r − 2qrps,t + 2qr − qr − 2ps,tpt,r + pt,r + ps,t − 1 + 1
= 4qrps,tpt,r − 2ps,tpt,r − 2qrps,t + 2ps,t − 2qrpt,r + qr + pt,r − 1 + 1− ps,t
= (2ps,t − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)(2qrpt,r − qr − pt,r + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
> qt since d is positive
) + 1− ps,t
> (2ps,t − 1)qt + 1− ps,t
= 2qtps,t − qt − ps,t + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
> qs as d′s = t is locally positive
> qs.
We conclude that q∗s(d′) > qs. It remains to show that for an agent z with dz = s, it still
holds that q∗z(d′) > qz. This can be shown by the same argument as above, now using the
fact that the delegations from z to s and from s to r are positive. Hence d′ is positive.
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Proof of Fact 1. For the upper bound of 2, Example 2 shows that maximal average accu-
racy can be made arbitrarily close to 1, while the average accuracy of a worse NE can be
made arbitrarily close to 0.5. For the lower bound of 1 it suffices to consider any delegation
game were R = ∅ (that is, no delegation is possible).
Proof of Fact 2. For the lower bound we can use again Example 2, where the average
accuracy of the worse NE can be made arbitrarily close to 0.5, and the average accuracy of
direct voting (which given the structure of the example is maximized by direct voting) can
be made arbitrarily close to 1. For the upper bound, consider an effortless homogeneous
game where q1 = 1, and qi = 0.5 +  for any i 6= 1 in N . Assume furthermore that R is
such that any agent can delegate only to 1. In such a game, the average accuracy of the
unique NE is 1, while the average accuracy of direct voting can be made arbitrarily close
to 0.5. We thereby obtain the desired bound of 0.5.
B Additional Simulation Results
Detailed results for the “Simulations” subsection “Iterated Best Response Dynamics”.
Figure 3 shows convergence speed results in the effortless setting for different network
types. The larger differences between the required number of best response updates for
lower degree graphs of different types (e.g. degree 4) coincide with differences between the
mean distance between nodes in those graphs: a shorter average distance yields a lower
number of best response updates. The latter is shown in Table 4.
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Figure 3: Total number of best response updates of the individual agents (left) and
corresponding number of full iterations over the network (right) for different network
types and degrees in the effortless setting.
Table 4: Mean distance between nodes and required number of best response updates
for degree-4 networks of different types, sorted from high to low.
Type Small World Regular Random Scale Free
Mean distance 4.97 4.39 4.03 3.41
BR updates 317.88 308.98 287.88 277.55
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